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Abstract: 
This dissertation analyses the effect of private sector 
involvement on the UK’s immigration regime. Drawing on 
academic literature, NGO and IGO research, government reports 
and statistics, and personal interviews with key NGO 
representatives, it traces the history of private involvement in 
detention and scrutinises the latest trends in the use of detention, 
enforced removals and asylum-seeker housing. It also provides 
analysis of the immigration regime as it exists in the UK today 
and outlines the legal framework and policy guidance in place to 
regulate it. 
The dissertation argues that the private sector has acted as a 
facilitator to detention expansion, and that private involvement 
in various aspects of detention, removals and housing have 
caused unique problems for human rights protection, and has 
exacerbated existing ones. It also concludes that private 
involvement has adversely affected the UK’s performance under 
international human rights laws and norms, and goes on to make 
recommendations for the improvement of service provision and 
human rights protection. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
i. Context 
 
The immigration detention system in the United Kingdom (UK), as well as provision of 
removal escorts and asylum-seeker housing, is almost entirely privatised. Immigration 
detention has been referred to as “the next, highly profitable frontier for the growing 
incarceration sector” (Bacon, 2005, p.3). The Home Office regularly awards contracts 
to private companies for the construction and operation of immigration removal centres 
(IRCs)1 and other immigration holding facilities, and for removal escorting services and 
other immigration-related functions such as housing for asylum-seekers and visa checks 
at points of entry. Although rules and guidelines exist to govern the companies’ 
management of such services, and although there are monitoring mechanisms in place 
to ensure adherence to these rules, there is concern in the human rights community 
about whether privatised immigration functions effectively protect the rights of those 
engaged. There is also concern that the private sector has become increasingly 
influential regarding the formation of policy in what should fundamentally be a public 
function of the state, and where this places the UK in terms of its adherence to 
international human rights law, and its observance of human rights norms and 
standards. 
 
In response to the limited amount of academic scrutiny of this situation, this dissertation 
analyses what the development of the current state of play means for the protection of 
rights of individuals involved. It focuses primarily on privatised detention but also 
discusses the privatisation of enforced removals and asylum-seeker housing. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Previously known as ‘immigration detention centres’, the name of these facilities was changed 
to ‘Immigration Removal Centres’ under section 66.1 of the Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act 2002. 
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ii. Research Questions 
 
This thesis attempts to answer three main questions: 
 
1. What role does the private sector play in the expansion of the immigration 
detention estate in the UK? 
2. What effect does privatisation of immigration detention and related functions in 
the UK have on the protection of the rights of those individuals engaged? 
3. How does private sector involvement in the immigration regime affect the 
United Kingdom’s performance under international human rights law and 
norms? 
 
The thesis is that the introduction of private involvement in the UK’s immigration 
functions has contributed to the growth of the detention estate and is problematic for 
effective human rights protection. The dissertation recommends alternatives to the 
current system that would better protect the rights of those involved, and that would 
bring the UK in line with its international obligations. 
 
 
iii. Methodology 
 
In researching this dissertation, the author has conducted an in-depth analysis of 
research by the most influential and active NGOs working in the area, as well as 
relevant academic literature.  The dissertation also draws on the findings of monitoring 
bodies such as the Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency, and Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP). In order to gain detailed NGO perspectives 
on the topic, interviews have been conducted with representatives from three 
organisations. The individuals interviewed were: 
 
• Michael Collins, Campaigns Coordinator (North), National Coalition of Anti-
Deportation Campaigns (NCADC) 
• Jerome Phelps, Director, Detention Action (formerly London Detainee Support 
Group) 
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• Dr Adeline Trude, Research and Policy Manager, Bail for Immigration 
Detainees (BID) 
  
In order to study the most recent developments, statistics were gathered through a 
combination of Freedom of Information Act requests to the UK Border Agency 
(UKBA), the Home Office agency tasked with protecting the UK’s borders, and the 
consultation of migrations and asylum statistics (Home Office, n.d.; National Archives, 
2010). Due to the delay in the publication of such statistics, most of the data gathered 
goes no further than 2011. 
 
The Home Office does not release extensive statistics detailing the total number of 
individuals present in detention every year. Rather, quarterly ‘snapshot’ numbers are 
given, indicating the number of people present in each detention centre on a specific 
day each quarter. Unfortunately, these numbers do not currently include individuals 
being held in prisons for immigration purposes. In order to facilitate a comprehensible 
overview of trends in immigration detention, the quarterly snapshots have been 
combined in places to produce an average detention population for a given year.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The adequacy of published asylum statistics has been subject to criticism from human rights 
organisations, e.g. Asylum Aid (2010), and scholars, e.g. Cohen (2008). 
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II. The Academic Literature 
 
 
i. Introduction 
 
The academic literature on the privatisation of state functions of suspension of liberty 
has focused overwhelmingly on prison privatisation, with very little attention paid to 
immigration detention. Contributions by Lilly & Knepper (1993), McDonald (1994), 
Nathan (2003), Wood (2003), Christie (1993) and Martin & Parker (1997) have 
nevertheless contributed ideas that prove to be useful in a consideration of how the 
current immigration detention regime has arisen. Bacon (2005), Molenaar & Neufeld 
(2003), Flynn & Cannon (2009) and Fernandes (2007) have discussed more fully 
privatised immigration detention in particular. In general, however, the literature 
remains relatively scant on this subject. This academic literature review looks at the 
important contributions to the discussion of private sector involvement in the 
suspension of liberty and locates a space in which this dissertation is situated. 
 
A central element to the study of privatised imprisonment and immigration detention 
has been the scrutiny of developments in incarceration or detention rates, alongside 
other relevant trends, such as crime rates and asylum applications. Christie (1993, p.14) 
points to “inexplicable” variations in crime and imprisonment rates: “Prison figures 
may go down in periods where they, according to crime statistics, economic and 
material conditions, ought to have gone up, and they may go up where they for the same 
reasons ought to have gone down.” To go some way to explaining such an apparently 
counterintuitive picture, he emphasises that “[a]n urge for expansion is built into 
industrial thinking, if for no other reason than to forestall being swallowed up by 
competitors” and that this urge applies as much to crime control as anywhere else 
(p.13). 
 
 
ii. The “Corrections-Commercial Complex” Framework 
 
For Lilly and Knepper (1993), the crucial factor in such trends is described by their 
influential “corrections-commercial complex” – a model of “subgovernment”, 
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comprising private contractors, government agencies and professional organisations, 
which influences and reforms policy on privatised imprisonment – basing the structure 
on United States (US) President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s popularisation of the term 
“military-industrial complex” in his farewell address on 17th January 1961.3 The 
subgovernment has four important characteristics: 
 
1. “First, the participants in a subgovernment share a close working relationship.” 
The cooperation between each actor involved in the subgovernment leads to a 
state where no one participant has the power to stop the actions of the whole. 
2. “Second, each subgovernment features a distinct overlap between the societal 
interest and the government bureaucracy in question.” This overlap manifests 
itself in a flow of personnel between government and industry, and a blurring of 
formerly distinct interests of public and private actors. 
3. “Third, subgovernments operate with a low level of visibility and a high degree 
of effectiveness from the point of view of those inside the subgovernment.” This 
effectiveness results in the efficient shaping of policy, without the scrutiny of 
the public or media. 
4. “Fourth, the subgovernment has the tendency to become a fixture within a given 
policy arena.” This subgovernment becomes embedded to the extent that it is 
referred to as an “iron triangle”, and becomes the norm to such an extent that 
“policymakers and private participants come to share the assumption that they 
are not only acting in their own interests, but in the general public interest as 
well” (Lilly and Knepper, 1993. pp.153-154). 
 
In this way, Lilly and Knepper construct a useful framework against which to compare 
certain characteristics of a system in order to ascertain whether the corrections-
commercial complex subgovernment may have taken hold. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 A recording of President Eisenhower’s address is available to view here: 
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-2465144342633379864# 
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iii. The United States 
 
Much like Lilly and Knepper’s free flow of personnel, Wood (2003, p.16) posits a 
“revolving door” between government and the private sector, resulting in “relative 
immunity from democratic accountability” when considering the rise of prison 
privatisation in the US. Rather than a response to rising crime rates, Wood sees the 
emergence of the “prison-industrial complex” as “part of a more profound 
transformation that has restructured both the American pattern of economic 
development and its characteristic forms of social control” (pp.16-17). In line with 
Christie’s analysis, Wood points out the highly indirect relationship between crime and 
imprisonment rates in the US between 1960 and 1999 and concludes that the crime rate 
cannot be the prime influence: “Rather it is the product of almost three decades of 
criminal justice legislation that have transformed the relationship between crime and 
punishment in the United States” (p.21). 
 
Wood charts the trends in crime rate and imprisonment rate in the United States 
between 1960 and 1999 in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: Historical Trends in rates of Crime and 
Imprisonment, United States, 1960-1999 (Wood, 2003, p.21). 
 
There is a clear lack of direct relationship between the crime and incarceration rates and 
Wood (2003) argues that the development is due to capitalist ideological factors which 
continue to drive it forward: “The structures and tendencies that have given rise to the 
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prison industrial complex – the uneven development of American capitalism, global 
overproduction, privatization, rentierization, flexibilization, neo-liberal restructuring 
and zero-sum politics at the national level – remain the dominant ones at work in the 
world today” (p.27). 
 
Fernandes (2007) provides a troubling perspective on the privatisation of immigration 
detention in the US. Again echoing Lilly and Knepper’s subgovernmental structure, she 
states that companies involved with public security contracts told her that “the key to 
standing out in the tight competition for contracts is to get as close to the decision 
makers as possible. This translates into luring present and former government 
employees onto staff or management” (p.188). She reports that 82 percent of ex-
government private sector lobbyists admit to lobbying the agencies they worked for 
previously. This model represents a good example of Lilly and Knepper’s 
subgovernment structure. 
 
 
iv. The United Kingdom 
 
McDonald (1994) provides an informative summary of the growth of the private prison 
industry in the UK, heavily influenced by the experience of the US. McDonald situates 
the export of the privatised US model to the UK within the ideological frameworks that 
fostered it. The US and UK had strongly conservative governments at the time who 
“launched a concerted attack on the institutional structures and ideology of the welfare 
state” (p.36).4 McDonald also factors in a rising prison population in the UK, a general 
dissatisfaction with prison conditions, and the pressure to create more capacity by 
constructing new facilities or converting old ones. He states that, alongside a growing 
prison population in the UK and US, both the speed and cost benefits of privatisation 
were important factors. Lengthy public-sector procurement procedures could be 
avoided, making the construction of new facilities much quicker. McDonald also cites 
then-Home Secretary Kenneth Clarke’s claim that a main reason for pursuing 
privatisation in this area was that it would deliver a cost benefit. However, it is pointed 
                                                 
4 The UK was governed by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party government 
between May 1979 and November 1990, and the US by President Ronald Reagan’s Republican 
Party between January 1981 and January 1989. 
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out that, because the contracts between the government and companies involved are 
commercially confidential in Britain, it is impossible to verify this claim. 
 
Martin and Parker (1997) explain the drive for general privatisation here in the 
following way: “In the UK, as in many other countries, the political pressure for 
privatisation came from a combination of disillusionment with the results of state 
ownership and from a belief that private ownership would bring substantial economic 
benefits” (p.3). State-run industry was considered wasteful and inefficient, not least 
because of the interference of trade unions that could be effectively sidestepped through 
privatisation. Ultimately, the official discourse was dominated with optimism regarding 
the unmatched competence of privatised industry: “From the beginning, government 
ministers have stuck tenaciously to the argument that the privatisation programme has 
been an outstanding success story, especially in terms of increasing efficiency” (Martin 
and Parker, 1997, p.3). 
 
Nathan (2003) elaborates on the developments in the UK: “There is no question that by 
1986/87 the prison system in England and Wales was in need of an overhaul, not least 
since the prisoner population had reached record levels at nearly 51,000” (p.163). 
Because privatisation was considered relatively less expensive and less subject to 
bureaucratic procurement procedures, it quickly became a significant presence in the 
development of prisons (McDonald, 1994). Today “the UK has developed the most 
privatized criminal justice system in Europe” (Nathan, 2003, p.165). The Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI), implemented in 1992 by the Conservative government, 
incentivises the privatisation of public functions by way of “transferring the risks 
associated with public service projects to the private sector in part or in full. Where a 
private sector contractor is judged best able to deal with risk, such as construction risk, 
then these responsibilities should be transferred to the private contractor” (Allen, 2001, 
p.7).5 As Nathan (2003) points out, the PFI subsequently became “the only option for 
procuring new prisons” (p.166). 
 
                                                 
5 The PFI scheme was launched as a way to save on costs for the public sector. Under the PFI, a 
private firm bears the cost of the setting-up and management involved in an outsourced public 
service, and the government then pays for the services provided by the firm in operating that 
service. 
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Nathan describes the policy reversal of the Labour government, newly elected in 1997, 
which acted in a manner completely inconsistent with their previous pledges to return 
private prisons to the public sector. To the contrary, prison privatisation continued to 
grow under this government, in line with the Private Finance Initiative scheme, and 
suggestions by industry players that the privatisation of the prison estate should grow 
further were broadly incorporated into policy, such as in Carter’s Review of PFI and 
Market Testing in the Prison Service (2001), a report for the HM Prison Service on the 
future of private involvement. This aggressively pro-detention policy has continued to 
shift the culture of the immigration regime in the UK up to the present, and this culture 
will be examined later. 
 
Molenaar and Neufeld (2003) analyse the use of privatised detention for asylum-seekers 
in Australia and the UK. They consider the problematic nature of this development: 
 
The detention of asylum-seekers, a group of people who for the most part have 
not committed any offence, is in itself a controversial subject. It is not rendered 
any less controversial by the trend among governments to contract out their 
responsibilities for refugee protection to private firms, especially since there are 
but a few multinational firms that have a stranglehold on the industry (p.127). 
 
Molenaar and Neufeld (2003) are highly critical of the neglectful treatment of detainees 
in several centres including the then-highly troublesome Campsfield House and Yarl’s 
Wood. They refer to the case of Quaquah and others v Group 4 Falck Global Solutions 
Ltd, concerning Campsfield House detainee John Quaquah, who was charged with 
rioting and violent disorder during a disturbance at the centre. Security officers of 
Group 4 (the company managing the centre at the time) were found to have fabricated 
evidence against Mr Quaquah in an effort to mislead that the Secretary of State called 
“wicked” (p.133). Crucially, the Home Office was struck from the claim when it was 
deemed by the court that the Secretary of State was not liable for torts of the contracted 
company and its employees, as the management of the facility had been delegated to 
that company. Molenaar and Neufeld explain that this “demonstrates how the process of 
privatization is allowing the government to pass off its responsibilities of caring for 
asylum-seekers, while maintaining its role to decide who qualifies as a refugee” 
(p.134). 
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Bacon (2005) makes a particularly important contribution on the subject. Her quite 
contemporary analysis draws on the themes of the prison and immigration detention 
privatisation literature and relates them to immigration detention in the UK, while 
pointing out the relative lack of attention awarded to privatised immigration detention: 
“The privatisation of immigration detention centres … has tended only to receive a 
cursory glance in relevant debates and scholarly analyses. This omission is puzzling, 
given that the companies with a large stake in private prisons are the very same as those 
who have a large stake in privately run immigration detention centres” (2005, p.2) 
Bacon demonstrates the growth of detention capacity by comparing the 250 spaces 
available in 1993 to the 2,644 in 2005 (2005, p.2). Indeed, this trend has continued; in 
June 2011, the UK detention capacity was approximately 3,500 places, with between 
2,000 and 3,000 migrants in detention at any given time over the past three years, and 
with approximately 27,000 entering detention in total in 2011 (Migration Observatory, 
2012). 
 
Alongside a lack of academic attention, Bacon (2005) emphasises the relative lack of 
legislation relating immigration detainees: “Immigration detainees are stripped of many 
of the legal safeguards suspected criminals are entitled to. At police stations, for 
example, a strict regime of time limits is imposed on the detention of criminal arrestees, 
while an immigration detainee can be detained for an indefinite period” (p.3). She 
argues that this gives government the ability to “resist scrutiny” with regard to 
immigration detention. The lack of public interest is attributed to the “administrative”, 
rather than “punitive” nature of immigration detention (p.3). Bacon argues that we must 
take a deeper look at the structural interests and factors involved in immigration 
detention in the UK, rather than taking a purely legal, policy or human-rights centred 
view such as that taken by Amnesty International and the Jesuit Refugee Service, as 
well as several scholars (p.4). Bacon deems it “necessary to question a system in which 
private companies have a vested interest in keeping the immigration detention 
population as high as possible” (p.4). She goes on to argue that private involvement can 
be “directly linked” to growth of capacity and detention and the move towards 
“increasingly harsh detention policy and practice” (p.4). 
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Bacon (2005) presents a system rife with cost-cutting, inadequate healthcare, failures to 
report problems and with insufficient accountability. It is also a system in which the 
emergence of alternatives to detention could be precluded by the growth and tenacity of 
the framework. “Like any industry, the private prison industry needs raw material, in 
this case, asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants. A detention regime based on 
presumption of release, or a reductionist ethos, would destroy the alliance of public and 
private interests inherent in the public industrial complex thesis” (p.26). 
 
 
v. International Comparisons 
 
Flynn & Cannon (2009) bring an international perspective into the discussion of 
immigration detention privatisation, by comparing the relatively lesser-known systems 
in Australia, Germany, Italy, South Africa and Sweden. They demonstrate that, while 
some similar issues may exist globally, there is wide variation between the effects of 
privatisation in each setting. In Australia, there has been a shift from a completely 
public system in 1998 to a completely privatised system today. The 2005 Palmer Report 
led to significant reforms on the part of the government, leading to some improvement, 
with the Australian Human Rights Commission reporting better conditions in 2007. 
However, advocacy organisations still demand the end of private involvement. 
 
The picture in Germany is more optimistic. Although the detention policy is 
decentralised to each state, or “Länder”, Flynn and Cannon reported good conditions in 
the Eisenhuttenstadt centre, run by B.O.S.S. Security and Service GmbH. The company 
has been praised in a 2007 European Parliament study, and a rights advocate 
interviewed by Flynn and Cannon claimed that the facility was better run than a police 
facility in Brandenburg, adding “If it were me, I’d prefer to be in the B.O.S.S. facility” 
(p.7). 
 
Italy’s system, on the other hand, is subject to a high degree of criticism from human 
rights NGOs. Its facilities are again managed by local prefectures, with contracts going 
to a variety of private actors. Flynn and Cannon (2009) report Human Rights Watch’s 
findings that “human rights organisations have been frequently denied access to the 
facilities” (p.9). The Italian Red Cross, the principle contractor for the centres, has been 
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strongly criticised in the media and by NGOs and the Council of Europe’s Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) for detention conditions. 
 
The private management of South Africa’s sole dedicated immigration detention centre, 
Lindela Holding Facility, has been criticised for its conditions by scholars, NGOs and 
the U.S. State Department, with allegations of corruption, abuse of detainees, and a lack 
of access for human rights groups. The contracted company in this case has “close ties 
to the government agency that contracts it and supposedly monitors its work” (p.11). 
 
Finally, Flynn and Cannon (2009) comment on the interesting experience in Sweden, 
now considered a “model country in terms of its treatment of immigration detainees” 
(p.12). The development of immigration detention in Sweden is unusual in that it 
shifted back from a privately-run estate to a publicly-run one, following criticism and 
allegations of bad conditions, abuse and a lack of transparency. The Swedish model will 
be discussed later in the dissertation. 
 
Flynn and Cannon’s conclusion is that, due to the generally non-transparent nature of 
the privatisation of immigration functions, it remains unclear in many cases why 
privatisation is pursued, and where it is clearer, the motivations appear to vary greatly 
between different countries. In some, it appears that “burden-sharing”, or diffusing 
responsibility, is the prime motive (2009, p.14). In others, such as the UK, it appears 
that immigration detention privatisation has acted as an “initial step” preceding 
privatisation of the prison estate (p.14). Elsewhere, it appears to have simply been a 
necessity due to strained systems. Flynn and Cannon’s analysis proves to be very useful 
in helping to consider alternatives to detention for immigration purposes. 
 
 
vi. Conclusion 
 
A study of the literature makes clear the uncertainty and lack of consensus concerning 
the motivation behind the privatisation of suspension of liberty. Bacon’s contribution to 
the literature is the most relevant and extensive on the specific issue of the privatisation 
of immigration detention in the UK and the arguments it posits provide an excellent 
jumping-off point for analysing the situation as it is today. However, this dissertation 
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will demonstrate that the picture today is somewhat different than it was in 2005 and 
will reveal that the current situation is a complex and nuanced one. It will also consider 
some crucial areas of the discussion that have thus far not been sufficiently analysed in 
academic literature. 
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III. The Immigration Regime in the United Kingdom 
 
 
i. Legal Framework and Non-Statutory Guidelines 
 
There are several categories of people who may be detained in an immigration 
detention facility: 
1. Asylum-seekers who have claimed asylum and await a decision 
2. Asylum-seekers who have claimed asylum and whose claim has been rejected 
3. Immigrants who have not entered the country legally (for example, not in 
possession of a valid passport or visa) 
4. Overstayers (individuals who have remained in the country beyond the terms of 
their visas) 
5. Foreign national ex-offenders 
 
The Immigration Act 1971 permits “the detention of persons pending examination or 
pending removal from the United Kingdom” for administrative, rather than punitive, 
reasons (Section 4, 2c). The power to detain is conferred on the Secretary of State, and 
individuals are detained by Immigration Officers, employed by the UKBA. The UK 
Borders Act 2007 extended the power of the UKBA (then the Borders and Immigration 
Agency) Immigration Officers to also detain individuals at ports. Chapter 55 of the 
UKBA’s Enforcement Instructions and Guidance, a non-statutory document, gives the 
following direction on the use of detention: “Detention must be used sparingly, and for 
the shortest period necessary. It is not an effective use of detention space to detain 
people for lengthy periods if it would be practical to effect detention later in the process 
once any rights of appeal have been exhausted” (UKBA, n.d.). However, the 
Immigration Act 1971 stipulates no limit in length of detention, and so it can be 
indefinite under UK law. There is no automatic appeal or bail mechanism for those 
detained. The UK has chosen not to opt in to the European Union Returns Directive 
2008, which sets an upper limit of eighteen months on immigration detention 
(Migration Observatory, 2011). 
 
If an asylum-seeker is not granted refugee status, and is not given permission to remain 
in the UK, the UKBA issues written notice that he or she will be removed. This 
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procedure is distinct from that of deportation. A person is generally deported after 
committing a criminal offence and deportation carries a longer period of time before 
one can reapply for status in the UK. 
 
A foreign national may be removed from the United Kingdom in the following three 
situations: 
1. Where a criminal court recommends deportation, under Section 3.6 Immigration 
Act 1971 
2. Where the Secretary of States considers that that the person’s deportation is 
conducive to the public good, under Section 3.5a Immigration Act 1971 
3. Where the person is sentenced to at least twelve months imprisonment for a 
criminal offence, under “automatic deportation” powers in Section 32 UK 
Borders Act 2007 or has been sentenced to any term of imprisonment if the 
offence is one specified by order of the Secretary of State under Section 72.4a 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. 
 
Assuming that an individual has exhausted all appeals and can no longer legally 
challenge his or her removal, the removal may still not be possible. If the individual 
does not have a valid passport, the UKBA issues emergency travel documents. The 
passport or travel documents are then examined by the receiving country’s embassy, 
who will often also interview the individual. The receiving country then decides 
whether they will accept the individual’s return. If it does not accept, the return cannot 
be carried out. The return will also be impossible if the country has been deemed as 
unsafe for return by the Home Secretary, or if the individual belongs to a certain group 
which is deemed unsuitable for return at that time. In such cases, the individual can 
apply for support under Section 4 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, which 
grants the individual a form of temporary leave, until such time as return is possible.6 
Unfortunately, in practice, an impediment to removal often does not result in a release 
from detention 
 
                                                 
6 When Section 4 support is not granted, this often results in the long-term detention of 
individuals who cannot be returned. 
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The conditions of detention are regulated by the statutory Detention Centre Rules 2001 
and the non-statutory Operating Standards for Immigration Removal Centres. Enforced 
removal from the UK is regulated by the Home Affairs Committee’s non-statutory 
Rules Governing Enforced Removals from the UK. The Human Rights Act 1998 also 
affords asylum-seekers and other foreign nationals a range of rights protection in the 
UK. As of 1 September 2011, private contractors may be prosecuted for deaths 
occurring in immigration detention facilities under the amended Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, if it can be proved that the death 
occurred as a result of a breach of the duty of care on the part of the contractor. 
 
The UKBA can select asylum applicants for the Detained Fast Track (DFT) system, 
which is used “to manage asylum applications that have been identified as ones where a 
decision to grant or refuse asylum can be made quickly” (Independent Chief Inspector 
of the UKBA, 2011a, p.2). If deemed suitable for DFT, an asylum applicant is detained 
immediately and stays in detention while his or her application is processed, and can 
then be quickly given a removal order and removed if necessary. 
 
HMIP oversees the operation of prisons, immigration detention facilities and juvenile 
detention facilities. HMIP is conferred this responsibility under the Prison Act 1952, 
carrying a duty to inspect each facility and report to the government on various issues, 
in particular on the treatment of the detained and the conditions of each facility (MoJ, 
2012). HMIP produces reports on conditions in IRCs, STHFs and, more recently, 
detainee escorting upon removal (MoJ, n.d.). 
 
The UK is party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee 
Convention), as well as its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, which 
defines a refugee as any person who: 
 
…owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a 
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result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it 
(Article 1). 
 
If a claim for protection is successful under the Refugee Convention, the individual will 
be awarded refugee status. If a claim for asylum fails, but a human rights claim 
succeeds, the individual can be awarded either temporary or permanent leave to remain 
in the United Kingdom – a status that affords the individual fewer benefits than that of a 
refugee, such as weaker rights to family reunion and travel documents (BIHR, 2006, 
p.13). 
 
The UK is also party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) which protects the right of liberty in Article 9 and does not allow for arbitrary 
arrest or detention. Any use of detention must be prescribed by law and the individual 
must be entitled to appeal it before a court. The Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is tasked with protecting refugees, and reports 
on the performance of states in this area. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
established by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, monitors the use of 
detention, investigates cases of arbitrary detention, and reports to the Human Rights 
Council on the subject. 
 
The UK is also party to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which 
prohibits torture and inhumane or degrading treatment (Article 3) and protects the right 
to respect for private and family life (Article 8). The UK is therefore obliged not to 
remove a person to a country where that person is at significant risk of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment, and may not interfere with the private and family life 
of an asylum-seeker or migrant – who may have a familial relationship with someone in 
the UK – so long as it would not be proportionate to do so in order to protect the rights 
of others. Article 5 protects the right to liberty and security, which may be limited in 
order to prevent unauthorised entry to a country or while an asylum application or 
similar process is being carried out. The detention must not be arbitrary and the 
detainee must be informed of the reasons for his or her detention, in a language he or 
she understands, and must be able to appeal against it. His or her case should be dealt 
with quickly so as to avoid lengthy detention (BIHR, 2006). 
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ii. Current Structure of the Immigration Regime 
 
The UKBA oversees the management of the UK’s immigration detention facilities. Ten 
of these are IRCs, the operation of seven of which is currently contracted to several 
private companies. There are four Short-Term Holding Facilities (STHFs), used to hold 
individuals for short term assessment, all of which are privately managed. The 
remaining facility is a pre-departure accommodation (PDA) facility called Cedars, 
where families may be required to stay if they refuse voluntary return. Cedars is 
managed by G4S and the children’s charity Barnardo’s. Healthcare is provided in each 
facility, and is either contracted to the (National Health Service) NHS, as in Prison 
Service-run centres, or subcontracted to a separate private health care provider by the 
companies running privately-managed centres. For details of the current contract-
holders, see Appendix A. 
 
 
iii. The Development of the Privatised Immigration Regime 
 
Unusually, when compared to the development of detention privatisation 
internationally, the private sector’s involvement in immigration detention in the UK 
predates its involvement in the operation of prisons. The management of the original 
Harmondsworth facility, as well as a small detention facility based at Manchester 
airport, was contracted out to UK-based security company Securicor in 1970. These 
were the first dedicated immigration detention facilities in the United Kingdom and the 
first to be run privately on behalf of the state (Bacon, 2005, p.6). 
 
Initially, immigration detention in the UK was limited to STHFs at airports with very 
low capacities (Phelps, 2011). To understand the subsequent expansion of the use of 
detention in the UK, we must consider the influence of the US on the issue of prison 
privatisation. Increasing costs of prison management and a growing incarceration rate in 
the UK led to an examination of prisons by the parliamentary Home Affairs Committee 
in 1986. The Committee’s remit during this examination included the possibility of 
visiting other countries to investigate their experiences. In the end, only one trip was 
made – to the US, in October of that year, and a year after the publication of 
McConville and Williams’ influential work promoting privatisation in the area, Crime 
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and Punishment: A Radical Rethink (1985). As Nathan (2003) explains, the Committee 
took a lot of inspiration from the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), and were 
spurred by research coming from the Adam Smith Institute; a UK-based policy institute 
promoting ideas of free market economic theory. The Committee recommended the use 
of prison privatisation in the UK in its fourth report Contract Provision of Prisons 
(1987), and was supported by further papers from the Adam Smith Institute, and from 
two academics, Maxwell Taylor and Ken Pease. By the end of 1991, the first contracts 
for a privately-run prison, The Wolds, had been signed (McDonald, 1994, pp.33-34). 
 
Bacon (2005) places the development of these trends within the context of Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher’s policies in the 1980s, alongside the pressure of a growing 
prison population and reports of unacceptable conditions in prisons: “When the 
Thatcher government floated a number of public utilities on the Stock Exchange in the 
early 1980s, it signalled a commitment to privatisation as a means of reducing public 
spending” (p.11). Bacon also considers that the experience of prison privatisation was a 
major influence on the growth of privatised immigration detention. “It is doubtful that 
the detention estate would have expanded in the same way, if at all, without the 
development and momentum of this movement, and the experience of prison 
privatisation in the US as a motivating force” (p.13). Today the majority of the 
immigration detention estate is managed and operated by private companies, and the 
capacity has risen dramatically overall. In 1993, Campsfield House was the only 
dedicated immigration detention centre in the UK, with a capacity of 184. By 2011, the 
UK’s immigration detention capacity (not including prison capacity) was 3508. Figure 
2 below provides a visualisation of the growing capacity between those years. 
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Figure 2: Total immigration detention capacity between 
1993 and 2010, not including spaces used in prisons7 
 
 
Accompanying the increase in private involvement in immigration detention, Bacon 
(2005, p.4) notes a “willingness to detain despite clear principles and rules limiting its 
use” and a “secrecy and lack of accountability inherent in immigration detention, and in 
some respects, the move towards increasingly harsh detention policy and practice.” 
These trends have certainly continued to the present day, as shall be discussed later. 
Serious abuse has also been alleged in the process of detention and removal of asylum-
seekers in recent years. Physical assault during detention and removals was reported in 
the media in 2007, including reference in the Independent newspaper to around 200 
cases of alleged mistreatment (Verkaik, 2007). The Home Office claimed that the 
allegations were unsupported, leading a group of solicitors and NGOs to produce the 
report Outsourcing Abuse (2008), outlining almost 300 such cases. The report described 
many incidents of physical assault against detainees and deportees and did not excuse 
the privatised nature of the estate for inaction: “While the practice of using private 
companies for running detention centres and escorting of forced removals may 
contribute to a certain level of ‘see no evil, hear no evil’, our understanding is that the 
Home Office is aware of an unacceptable level of alleged abuse through its own 
complaints procedure” (Birnberg Pierce and Partners, Medical Justice and NCADC, 
                                                 
7 Source: The author’s own Freedom of Information Act requests to the UKBA, as well as 
migrations and asylum statistics published by the Home Office (Home Office, n.d.; National 
Archives; 2010). 
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2008, p.3). The report also expressed serious concerns about the lack of transparency 
with regard to standards compliance of contracted companies. 
 
 
iv. Contracts and the Freedom of Information Act 2000 
 
The involvement of the private sector has led to a situation where contracts between the 
UKBA and private companies providing services in this area are commercially 
confidential. Public requests for access to these contracts are routinely denied across the 
board, as confirmed by Phelps (2012) and Trude (2012). These contracts are exempt 
from public scrutiny under the Freedom of Information Act (FOI) 20008 Section 22 (1) 
The author entered a FOI request to the UKBA for copies of the contracts with each 
relevant company for the management of several immigration detention facilities. The 
response is included in Appendix B. The request was denied pursuant to the exemption 
under section 22 (1) of the Act, which exempts information if it is due to be published 
at some time in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The Act gives the public a right of access to information held by the government and public 
authorities. Information is obtained by means of a FOI request submitted to the relevant agency, 
and the information requested must be provided unless exempted by the terms of the Act. 
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IV. The Expansion of the Privatised Detention Estate 
 
“The state still has a legal monopoly on violence, but it is now 
prepared to auction that monopoly to anyone with a turnover 
of billions and a jolly branding strategy.” (Penny, 2012). 
 
Figure 3: Rates of Asylum Applications and Immigration 
Detention in the United Kingdom, 2001-20109 
 
  
Figure 3 shows the development, between 2001 and 2011, of rates of asylum 
applications and immigration detention. Although not as dramatically disparate as 
Wood’s presentation of crime and incarceration rates in Figure 1, there is a clear lack of 
direct relationship between the two rates. As Figure 3 demonstrates, since a significant 
peak of asylum applications in the UK in 2002, the number of applications has been 
falling almost every year since, excluding 2008, with the most dramatic reductions 
taking place between 2002 and 2005, after which there is broad correlation for two 
years. Figure 3 also shows that there has been a slightly staggered but definite increase 
in the average number of detainees across the immigration detention estate at any given 
                                                 
9 Source: The author’s own Freedom of Information Act requests to the UKBA, as well as 
migrations and asylum statistics published by the Home Office (Home Office, n.d.; National 
Archives, 2010). 
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point. The driving force behind this trend is the subject of some considerable 
discussion. 
 
The Campaign to Close Campsfield (CCC), in its submission to the Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR) of the UK in 2011, expressed concerns about the dramatic increase in 
detention capacity over the last few decades and, referring to Bacon (2005, p.26) 
claimed that private companies “have largely driven this expansion” (CCC, 2011). 
However, this is a misreading of Bacon’s contribution. She specifically that such an 
assertion would be an overstatement. We can see, however, that at the time of writing in 
2005, Bacon would have seen a very dramatic picture. Between 2003 and 2005, while 
asylum application rates plummeted, the use of detention was rising at an accelerating 
rate. Indeed, since her report was published in 2005, asylum application rates have 
come nowhere near as high as they did in 2002, while the number of those detained has 
significantly increased, particularly after 2007. 
 
The most dramatic increase in detention, from 2007 onwards, remains to be explained. 
Two years prior to Bacon, Molenaar and Neufeld (2003, p.131) stated that 1 to 1.5 per 
cent of asylum-seekers were detained at any given time in the UK. In 2010, the average 
number of detainees equalled 15.44 per cent of asylum-seekers claiming in that year – 
an enormous increase. Both Phelps (2012) and Trude (2012) emphasise the importance 
of the increase in detention of foreign national ex-offenders into considerations of the 
growth of detention. The 2006 foreign prisoners scandal (Assinder, 2006) was quickly 
followed by the UK Borders Act 2007, which included a provision requiring the issuing 
of an automatic deportation order to a foreign national who has served a sentence of at 
least twelve months for a conviction, in most cases, or has amassed twelve months’ 
worth of sentences over four years (Trude, 2012). Effectively, “the discretion of the 
Secretary of State over whether to deport them or not was removed … hence, automatic 
deportation” (Trude, 2012). 
 
Under heavy political pressure to detain and deport these individuals, the UKBA 
neglected to give sufficient regard for the practical possibility of their removal. London 
Detainee Support Group (LDSG, now Detention Action) found that “almost half of 
people detained for over a year are from four countries: Algeria, Iran, Iraq and 
Somalia,” where returns are either impossible or incredibly difficult to facilitate (2010, 
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p.11). In such cases, detainees can end up stuck in detention for very long periods, 
sometimes up to several years. Furthermore, BID has discovered that only around 33-35 
per cent of foreign nationals in prison in the United Kingdom have access to any 
immigration advice and so cannot usually challenge their deportations (Trude, 2012). 
Although the UKBA’s Enforcement Instructions and Guidance only advises detention 
when “used sparingly, and for the shortest period necessary”, detention has become the 
norm. In 2011, The Independent Chief Inspector of the UKBA found “a culture where 
the default position is to identify factors that justify detention rather than considering 
each case in accordance with the published policy” (2011b, p.22). 
 
In the case of Abdi et al (2008), the UK’s High Court found that the UKBA were 
operating under a presumption of detention for foreign national ex-offenders, and that 
this was unlawful. In The Queen on the application of WL (Congo) 1 and 2 and KM 
(Jamaica) (2010), it was revealed that, as per secret UKBA guidelines, foreign national 
ex-offenders were being detained regardless of whether their return was possible. This 
was found to be a “blanket policy” (LDSG, 2010. p.15). LDSG reports a “change in 
atmosphere” as a result of subsequent case law, which has seemed to influence the 
policy of the UKBA and First-tier Tribunal, resulting in an improvement in the rate of 
release of detainees with similar cases which provides some optimism for the future 
(p17). 
 
Collins argues that the proportion of detainees who previously had status and have since 
lost it because of criminal activity should not be overstated. He emphasises the 
increased criminalisation of aspects of the asylum process in general. “I don’t think the 
foreign national ex-prisoners have really made that much of a dent in it. It might seem 
that they’re more represented there because of the criminalisation of various parts of 
seeking asylum and migration. So, back in 2001, you would not have gotten such a big 
sentence for using things like false documents” (Collins, 2012). Collins points to the 
oft-observed path to destitution and criminality that results from being refused the 
chance to work. Many individuals not detained – either because their case is in 
consideration, they have been found to be practically non-returnable, or they have been 
granted a form of leave to remain – often find themselves in this position. The British 
Red Cross described the situation in 2010: 
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It has been estimated there are up to 500,000 refused asylum-seekers in the UK. 
These are people who, for a rage of reasons, have not returned home, are still 
living in the UK with very limited or no access to support from the state and 
who are not allowed to work. They become reliant on the goodwill of friends 
and support from faith groups and charities. In many cases they experience 
exploitation, overcrowded living conditions, street homelessness, physical and 
mental illnesses and malnourishment (BRC, 2010, p.7). 
 
In a recent example, research by CITIZENS Organising Foundation’s campaign 
Citizens for Sanctuary in Nottingham found seventy failed asylum-seekers and three 
families with children destitute in the city, some of them sleeping rough (BBC News, 
2012). Collins explains that often the only way out of destitution for people in this 
situation is to obtain illegal work. “In order to get illegal work, they need to get false 
papers, and that carries with it a twelve month sentence … forcing them into crimes of 
poverty” (Collins, 2012). As a result, failed asylum-seekers may find themselves 
criminalised and subject to automatic deportation, inflating the rate of foreign national 
ex-offenders in detention following their sentences. 
 
Asylum-seekers – or, more strictly, those who have sought asylum at some point during 
their immigration adjudication processes (not necessarily immediately upon arrival) – 
continue to comprise the majority of the population of immigration detention. It is also 
worth noting that some foreign national ex-offenders apply for asylum while in prison 
and so contribute to the asylum application figures. Also, the use of DFT has 
significantly increased the number of individuals automatically being sent to detention 
since 2005, when the government announced its intention to process 30% of new 
applicants in this way (Migration Observatory, 2012). However, Trude emphasises that 
foreign national ex-offenders nevertheless do contribute very significantly to the 
growing use of detention and account for a sizeable contribution to the dramatic growth 
in detention rates seen since 2007 (Trude, 2012). It has resulted in “a bulge of people 
who, since 2007, have been filling up detention centres … So, although immigration 
detention started off as an asylum thing … now, the biggest thing about detention is the 
whole criminality issue” (Trude, 2012). 
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Considering the correlation between asylum applications and detention rate between 
2005 and 2007, and considering also the “hysterical extension of the scope of people 
who are pursued for detention” (Phelps, 2011) after the foreign national ex-offenders 
scandal, it would be difficult to argue, as CCC do, that it is direct private sector 
influence that has effected detention policy in recent years. Instead, perhaps a more 
nuanced argument of the effect of private sector interests can be made. As Bacon 
writes: 
 
While it is overstating the case to suggest that private interest drives detention 
policy or the decision to detain, private interest has nevertheless played an 
important role in the expansion of the detention estate. Indeed, legislators and 
policy makers would not be able to commit to increasing detention spaces 
without the co-operation, capacity and methods of the private sector (2005, 
p.27). 
 
Phelps posits that the “cultural addiction that we have, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon 
world, to locking people up is a very long-standing cultural, socio-political neurosis in 
our modern politics. Privatisation is one element of that, and an important and 
interesting one to monitor, but I think there is a danger of overstating direct cause” 
(Phelps, 2012). While it is difficult to frame private companies as the main driving 
force behind the increase in detention capacity and the use of detention, it is certainly 
possible to see their significance as facilitators in such developments. Trude states that 
“the private sector clearly has the capacity, perhaps more easily than the Prison Service, 
to step in where it is required … Even to put the bids together I would have thought is 
easier for them” (2012). 
 
The private sector has arguably come to be in a position from which it can function very 
effectively in its role as facilitator to the government with regard to the immigration 
regime in the UK. It is worth considering to what extent Lilly and Knepper’s (1993) 
“corrections-commercial complex” subgovernment model may apply in a UK-based 
version of what Fernandes calls an “immigration-industrial complex” (Fernandes, 2007, 
p.170). The subgovernment necessitates a close working relationship between each 
party, whereby no one participant can stop the actions of the entire entity. In the case of 
the UK, while particular security companies or political parties may change over time, 
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the long-term policy commitments of detention growth and tenacious, if not growing, 
private sector involvement suggests that certain elements of the expansion of detention 
may be somewhat beyond control for the time being. Bacon calls the contractual 
arrangements between industry and state “election-proof” in that they “tie governments 
into private sector participation in ways that would be difficult to unscramble” (2005, 
p.18). Bacon sees the Labour Party’s reversal on prison privatisation as explicable on 
these terms. 
 
Lilly and Knepper’s (1993) subgovernment comprises an overlap of interest, 
manifesting itself in a flow of personnel between industry and the state. They write: 
“The line between the public good and private interest becomes blurred as 
governmental and nongovernmental institutions become harder to distinguish” (p.153). 
We can see this borne out to a degree in the current circumstances in the UK. Alastair 
Lyons, chairman of Serco, was the non-executive director of the Department for Work 
and Pensions and the Department for Transport before his move to the private sector. 
We also see similar moves between private industry and advisory organisations with 
policy-level influence in the UK. John Connolly, chairman of security contractor G4S, 
is also on the boards of TheCityUK, the International Business Advisory Council for 
London (IBAC London) and the British American Business International Advisory 
Board. These organisations act to shape policy in the UK by providing advice and 
representing the private sector. TheCityUK “champions the international 
competitiveness of the financial services industry … playing an active role in the 
regulatory and trade policy debate” (TheCityUK, n.d.) The International Business 
Advisory Council for London “brings together forty seven distinguished business 
leaders from multinational giants to advise the Mayor on securing the capital’s position 
as a top global city” (Greater London Authority, n.d.). Finally, the British American 
Business International Advisory Board conducts a range of policy work including 
“direct, formal representations to Government on policy issues that are particularly 
important to our membership, ranging from taxation and immigration legislation to the 
UK Bribery Act and aviation policy” (British American Business, n.d.). This type of 
interest overlap leads to a situation where it becomes difficult to pinpoint where the 
state starts and ends in terms of its formation of public policy. 
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To a large extent, such exchange of influence and ideas happens out of the sight of 
public scrutiny. However, this element of Lilly and Knepper’s (1993) subgovernment 
perhaps does not apply as well as envisioned, in the current example – particularly 
given the heavy press coverage awarded to various blunders and misdeeds of privately 
contracted companies acting in public service functions. However, the ‘election-proof’ 
nature of much of the immigration regime, along with the novel but continually 
expanding normative shift towards seeing detention as a default reaction to certain 
immigration problems, contributes to the final element of Lilly and Knepper’s model. 
That is the formation of their “iron triangle” (p.154) – the development of the 
subgovernment as a fixture within immigration policy. That is not to say that the 
subgovernment model negates all other factors influencing the increased use of 
detention. We do not find in the UK a perfect and advanced example of this model as is 
arguably observed in the US (Fernandes, 2007). Rather, the UK’s immigration-
industrial subgovernment acts as a crucial facilitator of the solution to a somewhat 
artificially inflated problem. 
 
Phelps states, “I think it certainly makes it more attractive, for ideological reasons, to 
governments to open new detention centres if they can contract them out, because it is 
ideologically compatible,” but he is sceptical of the idea that private sector lobbying 
makes a significant impact: “I am not sure that the industry would need to particularly 
do anything here” (2012). Trude, on the other hand, posits that the private security firms 
“are lobbying the government in the same way that the prison service is lobbying and 
we are lobbying against the use, but they are obviously bigger and uglier and have got 
more money” (2012). Flynn and Cannon (2009) discuss: 
 
…the impact that private industry arguably can have on national legislative and 
regulatory frameworks governing immigration detention, which can be closely 
tied to contractor performance … Although it can be difficult to observe a direct 
causal relationship between the lobbying efforts of private contractors and 
worsening and/or expanding detention practices, the establishment of deeply 
rooted private incarceration regimes can engender an institutional momentum 
that takes on a life of its own (p.17). 
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The use of detention for immigration purposes has gradually gained a level of 
legitimacy that human rights NGOs and international organisations such as the UNHCR 
see as highly problematic. Trude states: “We have noticed that there is much less 
questioning about whether or not people should be detained and we are sitting here 
thinking, ‘This is administrative detention. This is discretionary detention. Even where 
people have a criminal record, they served their sentence’ … judges are not dealing 
with the issue of criminal risk” (2012). The Council of Europe has advised that 
detention be used “only as a last resort” (Council of Europe, 2010). The UNHCR’s 
Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-
Seekers state that detention is “inherently undesirable” and should only ever be resorted 
to “in cases of necessity”. (1999). To interpret the definition of such necessity, the 
Guidelines point to Conclusion No. 44 of the Executive Committee on the Detention of 
Refugees, which advises that detention is permissible: 
 
…only on grounds prescribed by law to verify identity; to determine the 
elements on which the claim to refugee status or asylum is based; to deal with 
cases where refugees or asylum-seekers have destroyed their travel and/or 
identity documents or have used fraudulent documents in order to mislead the 
authorities of the State in which they intend to claim asylum; or to protect 
national security or public order (UNHCR, 1986). 
 
Crucially, the conclusion emphasises “the importance of fair and expeditious 
procedures for determining refugee status or granting asylum in protecting refugees and 
asylum-seekers from unjustified or unduly prolonged detention” (UNHCR, 1986). 
 
The host state is also advised to avoid arbitrary detention and to comply with Article 31 
of the Refugee Convention, which disallows the punishment of asylum-seekers 
“provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause 
for their illegal entry or presence” and also emphasises that detention must only be used 
when necessary. Detention “must be exercised in a non-discriminatory manner and 
must be subject to judicial or administrative review to ensure that it continues to be 
necessary in the circumstances, with the possibility of release where no grounds for its 
continuation exist” (UNHCR, 1986). 
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Guideline 2 exempts asylum-seekers from detention as a general principle. Guideline 3 
stipulates that detention must be used only as a last resort, with a presumption against it: 
“Detention should therefore only take place after a full consideration of all possible 
alternatives, or when monitoring mechanisms have been demonstrated not to have 
achieved the lawful and legitimate purpose” (UNHCR, 1999). Clearly, detention in the 
UK falls well outside of these recommendations in practice. 
 
The 2009 Report of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention echoed the 
UNHCR view that detention should be used only as a last resort and for a short period. 
The report stresses Article 10 of the ICCPR, to which the UK is party, which states that 
“[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person,” and also Article 9 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights which recommends that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest, detention or exile” (UN General Assembly, 2009). 
 
Following from its 2009 inspection of human rights protection for migrants in the UK, 
the 16 March 2010 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, 
Jorge Bustamante gives the following recommendations to the government: 
 
 (a)  Consider the recommendations made by the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention in a 2009 report to the Human Rights Council, 
particularly the call upon States to restrict the use of detention for 
immigration purposes, ensuring that it is a measure of last resort, only 
permissible for the shortest period of time and when no less restrictive 
measure is available and therefore, to use and make available alternative 
measures to detention both in law and in practice;   
(b)  Take measures to review the implementation of national laws applicable 
to the detention of migrants to ensure that they are harmonized with 
international human rights norms that prohibit arbitrary detention and 
inhumane treatment;  
(c)  Take all necessary steps to prevent cases of de facto indefinite detention 
and grant to migrants in detention all judicial guarantees, including 
keeping them informed of their cases’ status. (UN Human Rights 
Council, 2010). 
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The UNHCR’s submission to the UPR for the UK expressed concern about the DFT 
procedure, under which a suitable asylum-seeker can be immediately and automatically 
detained if it is decided that his or her application can be dealt with quickly.10 The 
UNHCR found that the DFT process “does not have adequate safeguards against 
arbitrariness” and “also leaves open the possibility for an unlimited duration of 
detention” (2011). Such arbitrariness is not permitted under Article 9 of the ICCPR and 
Article 5 of the ECHR. The UNHCR also commented on the fact that the provision for 
the DFT procedure is not prescribed in law, as is required by the Executive Committee 
on the Detention of Refugees’ Conclusion 44 in order to be considered permissible. 
Furthermore, the reasons for its use are found to be “vague”. The UNHCR recommends 
that the UK not use detention “for administrative convenience” (UNHCR, 2011). 
 
Thus, it is clearly the perspective of the international human rights community that 
detention for immigration purposes is inherently problematic, and should be avoided 
wherever possible. Unfortunately, the UK’s policy on the matter has not developed 
according to such norms, and thus the UK has attracted criticism for its lack of 
observance of the norms and legal obligations outlined above. Detention capacity has 
increased by 50 per cent since 2007, while the number of removals has actually 
decreased. With a 2010 analysis reporting only a 34 per cent removal rate after 
detention (LDSG, 2010, p.8), it appears that the motivation behind immigration 
detention is no longer simply a matter of removal, but rather is politically and 
ideologically driven. Bosworth writes, “If earlier debates saw imprisonment as 
regrettable but sometimes necessary, by 2005 the White Paper Controlling our Borders 
presented detention as an aspiration, effectively erasing the distinction between criminal 
and asylum-seeker” (Bosworth, 2008 cited in GDP, 2011). 
 
With private involvement, it is now relatively much easier for the government to 
increase detention capacity by outsourcing its construction and management to 
contractors, saving it the red tape of procurement and other such factors. It is difficult to 
point to a direct causal relationship between private sector involvement and the growth 
                                                 
10 Concern has been raised about the adequacy of the selection screening process for DTF, as 
well as the significant delays and prolonged detention (Detention Action, 2011a). 
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of the detention estate, but it seems pertinent to suggest that private interests at least 
contribute to the cultural development – the move to legitimise the use of detention as a 
default response to immigration matters. Private sector contractors make this cultural 
shift much easier, as facilitators.  
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V. Privatisation and Human Rights Protection 
 
i. Conditions of Detention 
 
The effect that privatisation has had on the conditions within immigration detention has 
been the subject of much debate. Phelps warns of overstating the negative influence of 
private involvement. “Bringing in private security companies has historically led to 
some particularly poor practices in the UK, but equally probably some of the better 
practices as well, so I think it is a mixed picture” (2012). In fact, Phelps argues that the 
very nature of a private company, with its aims of preserving or improving its market 
value and ultimately winning and maintaining contracts, necessitates good practice. For 
Phelps, the entire detention estate has been compelled to clean up its act as a result of 
the lessons learned in the early to mid-2000s. He refers to two major disturbances at the 
Harmondsworth centre, in 2004 and 2006, which resulted in the company managing the 
centre losing the contract and accruing a £1 million fine for breaches of that contract 
and concludes, “I think it has given a lot of momentum to the HMIP narrative that we 
have got to look after people well” (Phelps, 2012). McDonald (1994) makes a similar 
point with regard to prison privatisation, writing that, “at least in the early stages of 
contracting, there appear to be disincentives to diminish services: if performance falls 
below agreed-upon standards in those ‘showcase’ facilities, firms risk losing contracts 
and clients” (p.42). 
 
However, echoing elements of Lilly and Knepper’s subgovernment model, Collins 
(2012) argues that the tenacious relationships between such companies and the Home 
Office often appear to be able to weather the storm of scandal. For example, G4S lost 
its contract to manage removals from the UK, after Jimmy Mubenga, a 46-year-old 
Angolan deportee, died in 2010 while forcibly restrained by G4S employees on a 
removal flight (Taylor and Lewis, 2012a). In 2012, however, G4S won a £203 million 
contract to provide housing for asylum-seekers in the UK. Collins observes that 
companies like G4S seem to win contracts “no matter what they do, no matter how 
many people die … something is wrong here” (Collins, 2012). Flynn and Cannon 
(2009, p.16) warn of the tenacity of such relationships as resulting from a 
monopolisation effect in prison privatisation: “[T]he consolidation of large parts of a 
market under one or a few companies, which has occurred in the United Kingdom and 
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in the United States, can eliminate the impact of competition.” McDonald (1994) is then 
quoted: 
 
Where governments have to be careful is to avoid becoming too dependent upon 
private provision. Strategies to minimize the risks of this include government 
retaining ownership of existing correctional facilities, and contracting only for 
management of new ones – because firms that establish themselves with 
physical assets in a particular jurisdiction may develop an unbeatable edge over 
potential competitors in future contract competitions (McDonald, 1994 cited in 
Flynn and Cannon, 2009, p.16). 
 
Sadly, in the UK, it has become common practice for both existing public prisons and 
immigration detention facilities to be “re-rolled” and contracted out to private 
companies. This has resulted in the UK having the most privatised prison system in 
Europe (Prison Reform Trust, 2011) as well as a heavily privatised immigration regime. 
 
Flynn and Cannon (2009, pp.16-17) present three mitigating circumstances that may 
override a contractor’s motivation to act properly. Firstly, there can exist very close ties 
between contracted industry players and government that tend to protect the deals done 
between them. Secondly, the estate is often found to be consolidated under a small 
number of companies, leading to a situation where competition is no longer a 
significant factor. This can result in a degree of dependence upon these few companies 
and can in turn remove the incentive to act properly. This, they claim, has occurred in 
the UK. Thirdly, Flynn and Cannon point out that contractors will often only improve 
their performance to a significant degree when faced with “high degrees of surveillance 
and oversight” (2009, p.16). 
 
There is a concern that private sector involvement inherently affects priorities of service 
management, leading to an emphasis on increasing profit, and reducing spending. In 
2011, Liberty reported that G4S and the UKBA had, without consultation, confiscated 
the mobile phones of all detainees and replaced them with their own phone system, 
reporting that the cost of calls were “exorbitant … One gentleman we interviewed saw 
prices soar by a staggering 1,152 per cent” in a centre where detainees receive an 
allowance of 71p per day (Norton, 2011).  Furthermore, it was reported that the network 
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could be “shut down in the event of what the authorities called a ‘serious disturbance’” 
(Norton, 2011). This scheme was reversed when Liberty and other organisations 
threatened legal action. Immigration detainees are also often employed by centre 
management to work on menial jobs around the centre for very low pay – as low as 50 
pence per hour, lower than the already humble £1 per hour recommended by the UKBA 
(McVeigh, 2011). McVeigh reported that detainees at Yarl’s Wood IRC described the 
work as “modern-day slavery” and accused Serco of exploitation. The Refugee Council 
called this a “cruel irony” due to the fact that asylum-seekers are not permitted to work 
in the UK (McVeigh, 2011). 
 
The Detention Centre Rules, according to Trude (2012), are “drawn incredibly loosely”, 
with much of the interpretation left up to the entity – whether public or private – 
managing a facility, echoing the concerns of Bacon that, compared to the level of 
regulation regarding the treatment of prisoners, immigration detention is very weakly 
regulated (2005, p.3).11 Trude (2012) also describes Prison Service staff as being much 
more extensively trained and regulated, with a lot more guidance, than private security 
staff. This has resulted from a wealth of case law on prison conditions over the years. 
This historical development has resulted in more rights protection for prisoners, who 
are, for example, afforded the right to argue against allegations made against them 
through an adjudication system. 
 
In BID’s experience, Detention Custody Officers (DCOs) working for private security 
companies are neither accustomed to, nor trained in, that way of working. Instead of 
considering mitigating factors in an incident, “they go straight to writing a report. They 
go straight to the use of segregation or removal from association” (Trude, 2012). At 
present, UKBA’s record-keeping of such reporting does not distinguish between victim 
and aggressor in incidents of aggression or bullying. Rather, “if your name is on the list, 
then whether you were the victim or the aggressor, you are there and that is brought up 
later on if you are trying to apply for release on bail” (Trude, 2012). It is also argued 
that private security staff are less incentivised to provide their services to a high 
standard. As an employee, “you are not working for a government service where paying 
                                                 
11 Phelps (2011) notes with interest the variation in the incredibly minimal response to the issue 
of indefinite immigration detention and the public outcry over the proposals for 42-day police 
detention of terror suspects. 
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conditions are being fought for by generations of trade unionists. That is all out the 
window because you are working for this private company that just hires and fires” 
(Collins, 2012). 
 
Phelps (2012) is more positive about the relative standard of conditions in immigration 
detention in the United Kingdom: “I do think that the way in which at least some of [the 
centres] are run is probably, by international comparison, among the best.” He reports 
that Colnbrook IRC, for example, is providing a wide range of facilities for detainees, 
such as kitchen facilities, detainee radio, and even beekeeping facilities, which one 
would not necessarily expect. “While ethically, in all sorts of ways, having the private 
security guard rather than the public servant in charge of your freedom and every aspect 
of your life is enormously problematic in practice, if I had to be detained somewhere, 
probably the top three centres I would choose, none of them are run by the Prison 
Service” (Phelps, 2012). Privately-run centres do generally feature at the bottom of the 
scale in terms of conditions at any given time, Phelps claims, but only because there are 
more of them. He states that the publicly-run centres tend to be around the middle. It 
seems not to be the case that privately-run facilities are clearly and demonstrably worse 
in terms of human rights protection than the publicly-run facilities, on the face of it. 
That is not to say that they are without issues particular to privatisation, however, the 
most pressing of which is that of privatised healthcare. 
 
 
ii. Healthcare Provision 
 
All interviewees agreed that healthcare provision in immigration detention is an area 
where private involvement has had a negative impact. In publicly run centres, the 
healthcare is provided by the NHS. In privately run centres, however, healthcare is 
subcontracted by the company managing the centre, to a second private entity. For 
example, the two Serco-run IRCs, Yarl’s Wood and Colnbrook, have their healthcare 
services provided by Serco Health, a subsidiary of Serco Group PLC. 
 
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has expressed concern 
about what it calls “the low level of support and difficult access to health care for 
rejected asylum-seekers” (2009, par.27). Phelps (2012) agrees that this subject is 
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problematic: “that is one area where there are potentially adverse incentives around 
contracting … It does not seem to be a good arrangement. The potential is there to save 
money by giving out aspirin rather than expensive medication.” He reports a tension for 
contractors between duties to patients and not wanting to upset the UKBA. Trude refers 
to three separate findings of Article 3 ECHR breaches for severely mentally ill 
detainees over the last year.12 
 
In practice, private subcontracting often means that the healthcare providers are 
“completely untouched” by the consequences of inadequate provision (Trude, 2012). 
Trude explains the consequence of this structure: 
 
It is impossible to get at the details of the contracts … If you want to find out 
about practices, it is so fragmented that you cannot find out across the estate 
what is happening with anything at all. You are forced to go to each contractor 
separately, so those who are working to improve conditions in detention want to 
find out what is happening in detention and you are kind of divided into as many 
parts as there are centres, so it multiplies the effort that you have to put into 
finding out and dealing with, and then negotiating with, each contractor and the 
UKBA jointly, on a separate basis. It is quite handy, if I can put it that way, for 
the Border Agency, because we are all kept much busier than we would be if we 
were just negotiating directly with them and one contractor or the Prison Service 
or whoever was running it. (2012). 
 
Indeed, the effects are felt more widely than only in the human rights advocacy sector: 
“The Inspectorate [HMIP] as well has a huge issue because it is looking at the way 
things are delivered in a very non-standard way” (Trude, 2012). Cohen’s detailed study 
of self harm and suicide in asylum-seekers in the UK shows that available data on such 
incidents are also markedly lacking (2008). 
 
Arnold (2011) has called access to healthcare in immigration detention “unavailable or 
dangerously slow” and has expressed concern that the UKBA is not experienced 
                                                 
12 These cases are: R (HA (Nigeria)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2012] 
EWHC 979 (Admin); R (BA) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 2748 
(Admin); and R (S) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 2120 (Admin). 
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enough in commissioning healthcare provision. He notes that, “since [the Home Office] 
was relieved the responsibility for prison healthcare – which was transferred to the 
Department of Health – improvements in standards and incomes have been substantial” 
(2011). 
 
Of particular concern is the detention of vulnerable individuals with particular health 
requirements. This practice is reported to be common, despite the UKBA’s own 
guidelines prohibiting the detention of vulnerable groups. The Association of Visitors to 
Immigration Detainees (AVID) reported on “the devastating impact that detention can 
have on the mental health of detainees who are held for long periods and with no idea 
of the outcome of their cases. Many are then released back into the community without 
adequate levels of preparation and support for this process” (2011, p.1). Chapter 55 of 
the UKBA’s Enforcement Instructions and Guidance states that “those suffering serious 
mental illness which cannot be satisfactorily managed within detention” cannot be 
detained other than in exceptional circumstances, although there exists no stringent 
guidance to determine what is manageable (AVID, 2011, p.3). Rule 35 of the Detention 
Centre Rules 2001 confers an obligation on the facility healthcare practitioner to “report 
to the manager on the case of any detained person whose health is likely to be 
injuriously affected by continued detention or any conditions of detention.” The 
management must then inform the Secretary of State immediately if this is the case. The 
continued detention of vulnerable individuals poses a massive problem in terms of 
human rights protection. AVID (p.7) state that “[t]he experience of being detained 
indefinitely has a very serious impact on the mental health of detainees. Prolonged 
detention is linked to psychological deterioration of those with pre-existing mental 
health conditions.” 
 
Mental health charity Mind investigated mental health provision in the UK for those in 
the immigration detention estate, as well as for refugees, in 2009 and produced the 
report A Civilised Society. They found a considerable lack of foreign language 
provision in healthcare, with a common reliance on friends and family to act as 
interpreters. There was a lack of awareness among medical staff of cultural differences. 
Legal restrictions on entitlements to mental healthcare prevented detainees from 
accessing it. The investigation found important gaps in service, including specialist help 
for torture victims and children. Voluntary sector carers often had to fill gaps in 
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services. GP services were inconsistent and access was often difficult. Individuals with 
mental health problems were being detained, where healthcare provision was 
insufficient. Finally, voluntary sector providers were often unable to meet demands for 
their service and co-operation with refugee organisations was insufficient (Mind, 2009). 
 
Immigration detainees are a population with a particularly high incidence of mental 
health issues resulting from trauma and a lack of social support (Mental Health in 
Immigration Detention Project, 2012). It has been demonstrated that they also have a 
higher rate of suicide and self-harm than prisoners (Cohen, 2008). Where privatisation 
exacerbates the problem is in the resulting lack of centralised standards. It is reported 
that the “provision for the identification and treatment of mental illness and distress 
varies enormously between IRCs, as do the type of facilities available in each centre” 
(Mental Health in Immigration Detention, 2012, p.6). With the contracts for healthcare 
provision remaining confidential, there is no available information on the process 
commissioning healthcare systems in privately-run immigration detention facilities. The 
only regulation concerning healthcare provision is in Rule 24 of the Detention Centre 
Rules, which obliges the centre to provide it, and to take particular care with regard to 
individuals with serious mental health needs. 
 
Healthcare provision is due to be moved to the NHS in the near future, but AVID and 
BID report that this transfer is now unlikely to occur until after April 2014. In the 
meantime, a change to the Enforcement Instructions and Guidance in Aug 2010 has 
effectively reduced number of people who would be defined as unfit for detention, by 
stipulating that an individual “must be ‘suffering from’ mental illness (i.e. 
symptomatic), and would need to have a ‘serious’ mental illness, before they could be 
considered possible unsuitable for detention” and one that could not be “satisfactorily 
managed” in detention (Mental Health in Immigration Detention Project, 2012, p.9). 
 
 
iii. Enforced Removals 
 
The enforced removal of failed asylum-seekers or deportees is another area of particular 
concern with regard to its privatisation. Amnesty International has reported “serious 
failings” in training for private security staff on the process of enforced removal; in 
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particular, inadequate training for use on aircraft, a lack of mandatory training on 
restraint techniques, and an absence of a stringent system for ensuring that those 
carrying out such duties have received adequate training (2011). In fact it was revealed 
in a secret communication in 2010 that G4S, who provided all removal escort services 
until 2011, had been permitting its staff to use restraint techniques that the government 
had advised should be avoided, and that the Prison Service was to phase out of use 
(Kenbar, 2010). 
 
After the death of Jimmy Mubenga during his removal flight in 2010, Gammeltoft-
Hansen predicted that the investigation would be unlikely to “address whether the UK 
Border Agency should face criminal liability for Mr Mubenga’s death because of its 
decision to outsource deportations in the first place” (2012). These predictions were 
proven correct when the Crown Prosecution Service decided to strike the Home Office 
from the case, thereby absolving the government of any responsibility for the tragedy. 
Furthermore, in July 2012, it was decided that the G4S guards involved in the incident 
would not face charges. Deborah Coles, co-director of Inquest, described this as 
 
…a shameful decision that flies in the face of the evidence about the dangerous 
use of force used against people being forcibly removed and the knowledge base 
that existed within G4S and the Home Office about the dangers of restraint 
techniques. It once again raises concerns about the quality of the investigations 
into deaths following the use of force by state agents and the decision-making 
process of the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] (Inquest, 2012). 
 
Following the revelations presented in Outsourcing Abuse, two reports were 
commissioned by the government on the subject of enforced removals. The first was the 
HMIP’s 2009 report Detainee Escorts and Removals: A Thematic Review, which found 
“considerable gaps and weaknesses in the systems for monitoring, investigating and 
complaining about incidents where force had been used or where abuse was alleged” 
(p.5) The inexperience the private security guards carrying out the escorts was clearly 
demonstrated by the inappropriate behaviour of some, who employed the use of force in 
an inconsistent manner, increasing the risk of ill-treatment. The second report came 
from an investigation by Baroness Nuala O’Loan DBE (2010) at the request of the 
Home Secretary and found “inadequate management of the use of force by the private 
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sector companies” and “confusion as to responsibilities, some lack of training and of 
understanding of the complaints procedures which applied, and management 
deficiencies in identifying these problems and addressing them” (p.5). O’Loan did 
report that improvements had been made in these areas, but extensive recommendations 
were still made (pp.10-11). 
 
Amnesty International also reported on the state of enforced removals in 2011 calling 
for “[a] complete and radical overhaul and reform of the current system” and arguing 
that “[r]eforms must drastically improve the training, monitoring, accountability and 
techniques employed during enforced removals” (2011, p.2). After the death of Jimmy 
Mubenga, G4S whistleblowers told Amnesty that managers had been repeatedly 
informed of the use of “carpet karaoke”, a restraint technique which involved “forcing 
an individual’s face down towards the carpet with such force that they were only able to 
scream inarticulately like a bad karaoke singer” (p.6). It is claimed by these 
whistleblowers that G4S management allowed this practice to continue by failing to act 
on the information provided to them. 
 
Amnesty (2011, p.7) reports that many Detainee Custody Officers carrying out 
removals had not received the minimum level of Control & Restraint and First Aid 
training required by the Home Office for accreditation. It is claimed that G4S had also 
been subcontracting to cover for staff shortages on escort flights and Amnesty points 
out that this dramatically exacerbates issues of inadequate training and lack of 
accountability (p.14). Unfortunately, despite the transfer of the escort contract from 
G4S to Reliance in 2011, it is reported that unacceptable practices by some staff on 
removal flights have continued. However an up-to-date HMIP inspection of escorting 
has yet to be made (Taylor and Lewis, 2012b). 
 
 
iv. Asylum-Seeker Housing 
 
There are concerns that security companies are unsuitable candidates for the provision 
of asylum-seeker housing contracts, and that this may result in a reduced quality of 
service (Plimmer and Warrell, 2012). Again, a lack of transparency appears to be an 
issue here. Collins recalls working with the Scottish Refugee Council before housing 
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for asylum-seekers was provided by the private sector. At the time, Glasgow City 
Council provided 95 per cent of the accommodation in the city, with the remaining 5% 
provided by the voluntary sector. “From that, we could get on the phone to the council 
and ask, ‘How many Zimbabwean families are in the North-West of the city?’ and they 
would tell you. And ‘What streets are they living in?’ and they would tell you, and then 
you could get a letter sent out to them” (Collins, 2012). This made providing health 
visitors with necessary information much easier. Collins also explains how the open 
sharing of information was facilitated through meeting with the council, social services, 
education services, health services, police, voluntary sector and housing association. 
Today, in stark contrast, such information is “a commercial secret … So all these 
forums that we set up from 2000 onwards for planning of services to support people, it 
is all gone” (Collins, 2012). 
 
Again, the lack of available information makes it very difficult to be sure about the 
adequacy of provision. “Through privatisation, you fragment the scrutiny of the 
delivery of [the] contracts, so that makes it more difficult to get inspection, other 
stakeholders’ scrutiny, and any sort of standardisation, as well as to challenge the 
delivery of services” (Trude, 2012). Grayson (2012) calls the privatisation of asylum-
seeker housing in the UK “the latest evidence of asylum-seekers being used as ‘guinea 
pigs’ to test unsavoury policies in such areas as welfare reform, legal aid and now 
housing.” He claims that campaigners perceive this as a transformation of housing into 
a form of “house arrest.”  
 
 
v. Alternatives 
 
Flynn and Cannon’s (2009) analysis of immigration detention internationally proves to 
be very useful in helping to consider alternatives to detention for immigration purposes. 
Their findings with regard to Sweden, considered a “model country” in this area, are 
particularly optimistic. In the mid-1990s, Sweden’s immigration detention estate was 
subject to harsh criticism by the national media and domestic human rights 
organisations. The government responded by carrying out an inquiry, resulting in the 
decision to reverse privatisation in 1997, along with several other changes developed in 
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consultation with domestic NGOs. The head of the Migration Board at the time, Anna 
Wessel, is quoted as saying: 
 
It was an ambition from the government that the treatment of the detainees 
should also reflect the fact that they were not criminals so that we could not 
enforce limitations on their civil rights more than was necessary to obtain the 
purpose of detention. Apart from the fact that they cannot leave the premises 
they are entitled to the same rights as any other person would be” (Mares, 2000 
cited in Flynn and Cannon, 2009, pp.12-13).  
 
Flynn and Cannon also report a drop in self-harm rates and an improvement in staff-
detainee relations as a result of these developments. 
 
Phelps (2012) goes further in his view of alternative: “The concept of a well-run 
detention centre is a hugely problematic one to start with. I am not sure that it is 
possible.” The UNHCR has recommended not a better-run detention regime, but 
alternatives to the detention regime. Their Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and 
Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers call of observance of the 
principle that detention should be a last resort, in cases of necessity, and so should 
never be automatic, or prolonged. Guideline 4 outlines four alternatives to detention, 
which should be considered before resorting to detention, and recommend that each 
asylum-seeker be assessed in order to find which would work best for him or her. These 
alternatives are: 
 
1. Monitoring requirements: These can be either reporting requirements, where 
the asylum-seeker would be in a position of liberty and would be required to 
report regularly to the authorities, or residency requirements, where the 
asylum-seeker would agree to reside at a particular address or within a 
particular region. 
2. Provision of a guarantor/surety: The guarantor would be responsible for the 
asylum-seeker’s attendance at appointments and hearings. A fine could then 
apply in the case of non-attendance. 
3. Release on bail: The asylum-seeker is informed of his or her right to apply 
for bail and the bail amount must be fair. This is available in the UK but 
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obtaining legal advice is often difficult and bail applications often need to be 
made by the detainee personally, with assistance from non-profit 
organisations such as BID (Trude, 2011). 
4. Open centres: This is where the asylum-seeker is effectively released but 
must reside at a specific centre within set times. (UNHCR, 1999). 
 
Amnesty International (2011) examined the enforced removal system in Germany and 
presented its model as a favourable alternative to that of the UK. They refer to a system 
in place in several German airports whereby forums made up of representatives from 
the government, NGOs and churches are responsible for monitoring removals and 
reporting on any problems that occur. This independent monitoring model produces an 
ongoing and transparent dialogue between the participating sectors and, in Amnesty’s 
view, “protects the rights of everyone involved in such procedures” (2011, p.13). 
 
The International Detention Coalition (IDC) responded to the rise in immigration 
detention globally with its report There are Alternatives (2011a). Drawing on the most 
effective mechanisms for preventing the use of detention currently used in various 
countries, this investigation produced the Community Assessment and Placement model 
(CAP model) a five-step approach for states wanting to reduce the use of unnecessary 
detention. These steps are as follows: 
 
1. Presume detention is not necessary: This allows alternative options the chance 
to be considered by immigration officers before the resort to detention. It is 
helpful to prescribe this presumption in law and policy guidance. 
2. Screen and assess the individual case: A thorough assessment can identify 
vulnerability in individuals – we have seen a lack of effectiveness in this type of 
screening in the UK. 
3. Assess the community setting: It helps to match the individual with the 
appropriate program of response by ensuring that the relevant community can 
support the individual’s compliance. 
4. Apply conditions in the community if necessary: These can include monitoring 
and supervision, or negative consequences for non-compliance. 
5. Detain only as the last resort in exceptional circumstances: Detention is 
inherently undesirable because of its associated adverse effects on health and 
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rights enjoyment. It also cannot be employed for vulnerable individuals. (IDC, 
2011a). 
 
The IDC concludes that not only is detention undesirable for various reasons, but it is 
also not effective: “It does not deter new arrivals and is costly to government and the 
individual. Furthermore, alternatives to detention promote better integration outcomes 
and better cooperation with return requirements” (IDC, 2011b). Phelps (2012) considers 
such alternatives promising: “There is growing evidence that that actually delivers 
governments’ objectives better than these very expensive detention centres that actually 
just entrench an adversarial relationship between migrants and governments.” 
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
In answering the three questions set out in the introduction, this dissertation has 
revealed a complex relationship between state and industry. First, it has considered the 
role of the private sector in the expansion of the immigration detention estate in the UK. 
The direct causal relationship claimed by some has not been found, but it can be seen 
that private involvement plays a ‘supporting role’ in detention expansion. 
Privatisation’s role has been demonstrated as being that of a facilitator of expansion. 
Certainly, without the involvement of the private sector, the dramatic increase in 
capacity over the last five years would have posed a significant challenge to the UK 
government financially and practically. Certain elements of Lilly and Knepper’s (1993) 
model of subgovernment have been seen to apply in the UK, and the comparison to 
their conception of such a system in the US proves helpful in predicting the worst-case 
consequences of continued growth here. However, the relationship between state and 
industry has not yet become sufficiently impervious to critical influence to allow for 
direct comparison with the picture painted of the US system by Lilly & Knepper and 
Fernandes (2007). 
 
Secondly, the dissertation has considered the effect of the privatisation of immigration 
detention and related functions on the rights protection of individuals engaged. Overall, 
privatisation has had a mixed influence on the human rights protection of immigration 
detainees, improving conditions in some respects, and requiring improvement in others. 
The right to protection from arbitrary detention does pose a serious problem, however. 
Human rights norms and the UKBA’s own guidelines recommend that detention is used 
sparingly and for the least possible amount of time. In the detention of foreign national 
ex-offenders and those deemed subject to DFT, however, we have seen that detention is 
being used as a default response in the UK. It is a firmly established international norm 
that detention is a last resort. Although the UK’s policy may conform to this idea in its 
published policy, it is clear that the actual practice does not. 
 
The subcontracting of healthcare provision is also highly troublesome in that it makes 
scrutiny difficult and is therefore subject to relatively little pressure to perform well. 
There are also very serious problems regarding the detention of vulnerable individuals 
who should not be detained, and with the way that such individuals are treated once in 
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detention. We have also see the effect of a lack of transparency in private provision of 
asylum-seeker housing, making it difficult for human rights organisations to reach out 
to the population they try to support. 
 
Finally, the dissertation has considered the effect of private involvement on the UK’s 
performance under international human rights laws and norms. As a result of the issues 
presented above, the UK finds itself the subject of criticism from domestic human rights 
organisations and international bodies. The criticism it has received from international 
authorities such as the UNHCR and the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Migrants has demonstrated that the UK is falling short of its commitments to 
international human rights law and norms in its treatment of individuals engaged in its 
immigration regime. The state is becoming more and more disconnected from its 
traditional public functions, while the private sector increasingly steps in to take its 
place, not only in terms of management but also responsibility, as we have seen in the 
recent case law discussed above. Thus, the state finds it increasingly difficult to control 
its international performance. 
 
The Council of Europe’s Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population stressed, in 
The Detention of Asylum-seekers and Irregular Migrants in Europe, that “where the 
member state ‘outsources’ the running of immigration detention centres (open or 
closed) to private contractors, it nonetheless retains its human rights responsibilities” 
(Council of Europe, 2010, 2,16). In fact, there has been a shift in the nature of 
contracting, with the private sector delivering the government a helpful way to remove 
itself from many problems associated with poor human rights protection. Thus, private 
involvement has exacerbated the aforementioned issues with the UK’s performance in 
human rights terms. 
 
There must be a serious public discussion on the effect of private sector involvement in 
the UK. This discussion would be of great utility if it were to take seriously the prospect 
of alternatives to the current immigration regime. The IDC’s (2011a) CAP model 
provides an excellent context for such a discussion, in-keeping as it is with the tone of 
the UKBA’s own guidelines. The lack of transparency inherent in private involvement 
would be incredibly difficult to address, due to the historically embedded nature of such 
traditions of commercial secrecy in British legal culture. However, there are practical 
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steps that could be taken to improve the situation. The following examples are not 
exhaustive: 
 
• Healthcare provision in immigration detention facilities should be transferred to 
the NHS. 
• More thorough consideration should be given, on a case-by case basis, to the 
practical removability of foreign national ex-offenders before employing 
detention. 
• Independent monitoring should be employed in enforced removals, drawing on 
the experience of the German model. 
• Recording and publication of more complete data on detention, in order to allow 
for scrutiny of human rights protection of detainees. 
• Recording and publication of data on individuals in asylum-seeker housing, in 
order to allow NGOs to assist more effectively in providing voluntary services 
to that population. 
• Urgent government intervention regarding contractors’ training procedures in 
detention and removals services, in consultation with relevant NGOs. 
• Urgent revision of UKBA training procedures with regard to selection for 
Detained Fast Track of individuals by Immigration Officers, in consultation 
with relevant NGOs. 
• Active government consultation with UK NGOs and international organisations 
such as the IDC on exploring paths to implementation of alternatives to 
detention. 
 
Although privatisation can have its place, and has resulted in some reasonably well-run 
operations in comparison to some publicly-run functions, there are issues particular to 
private sector involvement that must be addressed and effectively monitored as the UK 
moves towards having a more just immigration regime. 
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Appendix A 
 
The Current Contract-Holders in Immigration Detention, Removals Escorting and 
Asylum-Seeker Housing. 
 
The following are the current contract-holders for immigration detention in the UK: 
 
Facility Name Centre Management Health Care Provider 
Brook House IRC G4S Saxonbrook 
Campsfield House IRC MITIE The Practice PLC 
Dover IRC HM Prison Service NHS 
Dungavel IRC GEO Primecare 
Harmondsworth IRC GEO Primecare 
Haslar IRC HM Prison Service NHS 
Morton Hall IRC HM Prison Service & UKBA G4S Medical 
Tinsley House IRC G4S Saxonbrook 
Yarl’s Wood IRC & STHF Serco Serco Health 
Colnbrook IRC & STHF Serco Serco Health 
Larne House STHF Reliance Reliance Medical Services 
Pennine House STHF Reliance Information Unavailable 
Cedars PDA G4S & Barnardo’s G4S Medical 
 
Enforced removals are currently carried out by Reliance Security, who took over the 
contract from G4S on 1st May 2011 (Parliament, 2012). 
 
Housing for asylum-seekers is managed by G4S, Serco and Reliance. G4S’s contract 
covers the Midlands & East England and North East Yorkshire & Humber; Reliance’s 
contract covers Wales and London & the South; and Serco’s two contracts cover the 
North West and Scotland & Northern Ireland (Corporate Watch, 2010). 
 
Appendix B 
 
Freedom of Information Act Request Denial 
 
 
 
Dave Shortland 
 
 
By email 
 
 
 
4 July 2012 
 
REF: FOI 22981 
 
Dear Mr Shortland,  
 
Thank you for your email of 6 June 2012 about the contracts for the 
immigration removal centres (IRCs) and short term holding facilities (STHF). 
Your request falls to be dealt with under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. 
You have asked for the following:   
“Digital copies of the contracts with each relevant company, for the 
management of each of the following immigration removal and holding 
facilities: Brook House, Campsfield House, Cedars, Colnbrook, Dungavel, 
Harmondsworth, Larne, Oakington, Pennine House, Tinsley House, Yarl's 
Wood.  
I can confirm that UKBA holds the information you have requested. However, 
I have decided not to communicate this information to you pursuant to the 
exemption under section 22 (1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.  This 
allows us to exempt information if it is intended for future publication. 
 
The use of this exemption requires consideration of whether it is: 
 
 Reasonable in all the circumstances to withhold the information until 
the intended publication date,  and 
 Whether in all the circumstances of the case the public interest in 
maintaining the exemption stated above outweighs the public interest 
in disclosing the information. 
 
The central issue is whether in all the circumstances it is reasonable and in 
accordance with the public interest to require you to wait for publication. 
 
We recognise there may be a public interest in disclosing this information to 
you now and that this may also weigh in favour of it being unreasonable to 
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make you wait for publication to see the redacted copies of the contracts.  We 
have considered the following: 
 
 It is important that the public have access to information to ensure 
there is full transparency in the Home Office’s use of public funds and 
to maintain the Department’s accountability to taxpayers.     
 
But there are also public interest reasons for maintaining the exemption to the 
duty to communicate which weigh in favour of it being reasonable to require 
you to wait for publication. We have considered the following: 
 
 There is a public interest in permitting UKBA to publish redacted copies 
of the contracts in a manner and form of its own choosing which could 
be undermined by immediate disclosure. 
 
 There is also the cost to the taxpayer because the documents are too 
large to be sent out electronically so we would have to print each one 
which would amount to thousands of pages so this is not cost effective. 
In addition this would not be the best use of staff resources.  
 
 Publishing the redacted contracts on the UKBA Website would enable 
all interested parties to be able to view each one which in turn would 
reduce the number of requests for the contracts rather than printing 
them off when requested.  
 
After balancing these conflicting arguments around publication, we have 
concluded not only that it is reasonable to require you to wait for publication 
but also that the balance of the public interests identified favours maintaining 
the exemption.  This is not least because we believe that in this case the 
overall public interest lies in favour of ensuring that UKBA is able to plan its 
publication of information in a managed and cost effective way, and this would 
not be possible if immediate disclosure were made. I will write you once the 
contracts are available to advise you where they can be located. 
 
I must also advise you that certain parts of the contracts and associated 
documentation will be redacted. This is due to the fact that various 
exemptions to the requirement to disclose are applicable. The exemptions 
that apply in this instance are section 31(1)(f) (Law Enforcement), Section 40 
(Personal Information), Section 41 (information Provided in Confidence) and 
Section 43(2) (Commercial Interests). 
 
The exemptions contained in sections 40 and 41 are absolute; however the 
exemptions contained in sections 31(1) (f) and 43(2) are qualified. In relation 
to these sections we have had to balance the public interest in withholding the 
information against the public interest in disclosure.  
 
We intend to redact some information pursuant to Section 31(1) (f), where it 
relates to active removal centres because of the need for certain safety and 
security operational matters to remain highly confidential. The use of this 
exemption also requires us to consider whether in all the circumstances of the 
case the public interest in maintaining the exemption stated above outweighs 
the public interest in disclosing the information.  
 
We have considered the public interest there may be in the circumstances of 
this case in disclosing the information. There may be a public interest in 
disclosure of this information as it would allow the public to assess what 
security measures are in place on a site and make an evaluation of the 
robustness of these provisions.  
 
We have also considered the public interest there may be in maintaining the 
exemption to the duty to communicate. The UK Border Agency requires the 
ability to maintain the integrity of its security measures and disclosure of this 
information into the public domain may allow people to circumvent such 
measures. This would prove detrimental to the maintenance of good order 
within the immigration removal centres covered within the scope of this 
request. This is not in the public interest.  
 
We have considered whether in all the circumstances of the case the public 
interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in 
disclosing the information. We have concluded that the balance of the public 
interests identified lies in favour of maintaining the exemption. This is because 
The UK Border Agency requires the ability to maintain the integrity of certain 
operational and security matters in order to preserve good order within its 
IRCs.  
 
With regard to section 43(2), some of the information falls to be exempted 
from disclosure as it relates to contractual values and technical information. 
The use of this exemption also requires us to consider whether in all the 
circumstances of the case the public interest in maintaining the exemption 
stated above outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information. 
 
We have considered the public interest in disclosing the information. There 
will be a public interest in the disclosure of this information to ensure that 
there is full transparency in the Home Office’s use of public funds and in 
particular to maintain the Department’s accountability to taxpayers. Disclosure 
of this information would also enable the public to assess whether or not 
Home Office is getting best value for money in terms of its contracts with 
those who manage its immigration detention facilities.  
 
We have also considered the public interest in maintaining the exemption to 
communicate. There is a public interest in Government department’s being 
able to secure contracts that represent value for money and anything that 
would undermine this is not in the public interest. Value for money can be best 
obtained where there is a healthy competitive environment, coupled with the 
protection of Government’s commercial relationships with industry, were this 
not the case, there would be a risk that: 
 
• Companies would be discouraged from dealing with the public sector, 
fearing disclosure of information that may damage them commercially, or 
• Companies would withhold information where possible, making the choice of 
the best contractor more uncertain as it would be based on limited and 
censored data. 
 
We have therefore concluded that the balance of the public interests identified 
lies in favour of maintaining the exemption. This is because the overall public 
interest lies in ensuring that the Home Office’s ability to protect its commercial 
competitiveness is not prejudiced.  
 
If you are dissatisfied with this response you may request an independent 
internal review of our handling of your request. Internal review request should 
be submitted within two months of the UK Border Agency sending a 
substantive reply to your original request and should be addressed to: 
 
Information Access Team 
Home Office 
Ground Floor, Seacole Building 
2 Marsham Street 
London SW1P 4DF 
e-mail: FOIRequests@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk 
 
 
During the independent review the department’s handling of your information 
request will be reassessed by staff who were not involved in providing you 
with this response. Should you remain dissatisfied after this internal review, 
you will have a right of complaint to the Information Commissioner as 
established by section 50 of the Freedom of Information Act. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
David Goggin 
Return Directorate  
UK Border Agency  
 
Appendix C 
 
Interview Consent Forms 
i. Michael Collins, NCADC 
ii. Jerome Phelps, Detention Action 
iii. Dr Adeline Trude, BID 






